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UNDOING NEUTRALITY?
FROM CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION TO JUDEO-
CHRISTIAN TOLERANCE
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
Nearly 50 years ago, Philip Kurland proposed that the Religion
Clauses be read as a flat prohibition on religious classifications,1 one
that strikingly resembled the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of
racial, ethnic, and other suspect classifications. 2  This reading of a
"religious neutrality" norm into the Clauses understood the
Establishment Clause to prohibit the distribution of government
benefits, and the Free Exercise Clause to prohibit the distribution of
government burdens, on the basis of religious classifications.
3
The dominant norm of Religion Clause doctrine is now the very
religious neutrality that Kurland urged more than half a century ago.
. Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School;
gedicksf@law.byu.edu. I am grateful to Allision Shiozawa Miles and Will Hains for research
assistance. In addition to the discussion of these themes at Willamette, I benefitted from
comments and criticisms of earlier versions of this Essay at a faculty and graduate student
colloquium at the Istituto Ecclesiastico of the Universiti degli Studi di Milano (11 Bocconi) in
Milan, Italy in May 2009, and at a conference on the so-called "government speech" doctrine
held at BYU Law School in March 2010.
1. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 17-18 (University of Chicago Press 1962) [hereinafter KURLAND, RELIGION
AND THE LAW] ("[R]eligion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the
imposition of duties or obligations."). Professor Kurland first made this argument in a law
review article of the same title published the prior year. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
2. See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 5.
3. See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 18 ("[T]he freedom and
separation clauses should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize religion as
a standard for action or inaction because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.").
WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW
But it took a generation for the doctrine to get there, and it's not clear
that it will stay there very long.
Post-incorporation Religion Clause doctrine is the story of a long
shift from a dominant norm of strict separation of church and state,4
to one of religious neutrality, 5 to the brink of a new norm of "Judeo-
Christian tolerance"--the constitutionalization of American civil
religious practices like references to deity in government and patriotic
settings, so-called "nonsectarian" prayer, and government-sponsored
religious displays and symbols.6 The possibility that tolerance might
displace neutrality arises from the convergence of three doctrinal
developments: the emergence of "acknowledgment" of religion as
permissible government action under the Establishment Clause,7 the
elaboration of a "government speech" principle under the Speech
Clause,8 and the likely replacement of "endorsement" by "coercion"
as the principal test of government action going forward under the
Establishment Clause.9 The displacement of neutrality by tolerance
would eliminate most Establishment Clause constraints on
government use of religious symbols and worship, and would threaten
to undo the apparently stable resolution of the question of financial
assistance to religion. In short, the boundaries of mainstream
Establishment Clause doctrine have shifted to the right: Whereas
neutrality was once the best that accommodationists could hope for, it
is now the best that separationists can hope for.
I. STRICT SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
There was little precedential support for a "doctrine" of religious
neutrality when Kurland announced it,' 0 mostly because there were
hardly any Religion Clause precedents at all in the early 1960s.1 Nor
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part III-A.
8. See infra Part I11-B.
9. See infra Part III-C.
10. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 16 (observing that religious
neutrality was a "doctrine in search of authority") (initial capitals deleted).
11. After incorporating the Religion Clauses against the states in the 1940s, see Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause), the Court decided only two additional cases under the
Clauses prior to the 1960s. See Zorach v. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released-
time program of off-campus religious instruction for public school students); McCollum v.
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did Kurland's endorsement of neutrality look very prophetic at first,
because in the following decades the Court took precisely the
opposite doctrinal turn. Under the Establishment Clause, the Court
imposed special restrictions on government interactions with religious
individuals and institutions, restrictions that were generally not
imposed on its interactions with secular individuals and institutions.
The Court denied religious individuals and institutions access to many
social welfare benefits that were available to secular individuals and
institutions,1 2 it prohibited government taxation of church property on
the basis of a "nonentanglement" prophylactic that applied only to
religious institutions, 13 it prohibited the delegation of government
authority to religious institutions (though not to secular ones),' 4 and it
prohibited government sponsorship of religious beliefs, practices, or
symbols, while imposing no restrictions on government use of their
secular analogues.' 5  Finally, the Court placed internal church
governance decisions wholly beyond judicial review,16 while leaving
intact judicial review of the internal governance decisions of secular
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down program of on-campus religious
instruction for public school students).
12. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
13. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
14. See Village of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating, under
the Establishment Clause, invocations at public high school football game delivered by a
student who was chosen by a majority vote of the student body); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (same with respect to state
requirement that creationism be taught in public high schools whenever evolution is taught);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (same with respect to public school-sponsored moment
of silence for voluntary student prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (same with
respect to stand-alone public school display of Ten Commandments); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (same with respect to state initiative prohibiting the teaching of evolution
in public schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (same with respect to public
school-sponsored prayer and Bible-reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (same with
respect to public school-sponsored recitation of prayer composed by state board of education).
16. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that
First Amendment requires absolute judicial deference to internal church rules for selecting and
removing archbishops); Presbyterian Ch. v. Mary Elizabeth Hull. Mem. Presbyterian Ch., 393
U.S. 440 (1969) (same with respect to internal church rules for holding title to property). The
Court has never specified whether these decisions are rooted in the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause.
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organizations.17  The Free Exercise Clause of this era was also
separationist, although it is not always conceptualized in that manner.
The Court's extension of a special benefit to religious exercise in the
form of exemptions from otherwise valid and applicable laws-a
benefit not generally afforded to morally comparable secular
conduct-functionally separated religious exercise from normal,
baseline categories of conduct subject to government regulation.'8
By the 1980s, the Court had built a doctrinal regime for the
Religion Clauses that contradicted religious neutrality. With few
exceptions, 19 Religion Clause doctrine approached religious belief
and practice as constitutionally distinct activities that called for
constitutionally distinct rules when they interacted with government.
20
This separationist doctrine created a certain symmetry between the
two Clauses: the special burdens on religion imposed by the
Establishment Clause were balanced by the special benefit of
exemptions afforded religious practices under the Free Exercise
Clause.21
17. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 123-24 (1986)
(observing that the management decisions of corporate directors are subject to judicial review
when "tainted by fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality," or rising to "gross negligence").
18. See, e.g., Frazee v. 11. Dep't of Employment Sec. (Unemployment Compensation
Cases), 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that decision to withhold unemployment benefits from
claimant terminated for religiously motivated conduct subject to strict scrutiny); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (same); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (same); Sherbert v.
Verer, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15
(1972) (holding that decision not to exempt Amish parents who refused to send high-school
age children to school from compliance with compulsory school attendance law subject to
strict scrutiny). As Professor Tushnet has observed, the so-called exemption doctrine was
more apparent than real; during this period, the Court rejected all exemption claims by non-
Christians, and many such claims by Christians. See Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and
the Supreme Court ": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 379.
19. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980) (holding reimbursement of private religious schools for performing state mandated
diagnostic and test services did not violate Establishment Clause); Board of Educ. of Central
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (same with respect to inclusion of private
religious schools in state textbook loan program along with public and private secular schools).
20. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 83, 91-94.
21. Abner Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611,
1634-39(1993).
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II. NEUTRALITY AMONG RELIGIONS AND BETWEEN BELIEF AND
UNBELIEF
Change, however, was afoot. In a series of decisions beginning
in the 1980s, the Court moved steadily away from the strict separation
of church and state until, by the end of the 1990s, it appeared that
Kurland's view had swept the doctrinal field. The strict separation of
church and state was displaced by the new Religion Clause norm of
religious neutrality-i.e., government must not take sides between
particular religions or denominations, or between belief or unbelief.
The Court transformed the Free Exercise Clause into a subdivision of
the Equal Protection Clause, holding that it protected against overt
religious discrimination, but gave believers no right to exemptions
from religiously neutral, generally applicable laws, even when such
laws prohibited or otherwise burdened their religious practices.22 As
for the Establishment Clause, the Court recast it from a largely
separationist limit on government interactions with religion into a
largely permissive guarantee of religious neutrality in those same
interactions. It did so by affording religious institutions access to
social welfare benefits on an equal basis with secular institutions,23
justifying church tax exemptions by an anti-discrimination rather than
a nonentanglement rationale,24 and creating a "neutral principles"
22. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534-35 (1993) (finding animal protection ordinances violated Free Exercise Clause as applied
to religious sect practicing animal sacrifice because statute permitted virtually every species of
animal killing except those practiced by sect); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-
89 (1990) (holding that state refusal of unemployment benefits to native American who used
peyote as religious sacrament in violation of neutral and general criminal law was not subject
to strict scrutiny).
23. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (upholding tuition
voucher program in which ninety-six percent of the voucher funds were directed to religiously
affiliated schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
234-35 (1997) (upholding provision of remedial education, guidance, and job counseling
services by public school employees to low-income students attending qualified private
elementary or secondary school); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1993) (upholding provision of state-salaried sign language interpreter to deaf student
attending Roman Catholic high school); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (upholding payment of state vocational rehabilitation grant on behalf of
blind recipient studying for ministry at Bible college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402
(1983) (upholding income tax deduction for tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses
incurred in sending child to public or qualified private elementary or secondary school).
24. See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (invalidating special sales
tax exemption for religious magazines); cf Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,
708-09 (1985) (invalidating state law mandating that religious employees be excused from
working on their Sabbath, but granting no such right to employees wishing to be excused for
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exception to the rule of nonjusticiability that previously governed
internal church disputes.2 5
Even the theretofore strict prohibition on government
appropriation of religious beliefs, practices, and symbols was
somewhat relaxed by neutrality principles. The Court protected
private religious speech in public schools (including even some forms
of religious devotion) by importing the Speech Clause prohibitions on
content- and viewpoint-based government discrimination that have
long protected speech in public forums and on other government
26property. 6 Notably, the Court emphasized that permitting religious
speech in a public forum did not constitute government endorsement
of religion, so long as the forum was equally open to nonreligious and
anti-religious speech. 7
The displacement of separation by neutrality solved a host of
doctrinal problems. The new no-exemption rule under the Free
Exercise Clause eliminated the need to identify and police the
definitional boundaries of "religion" and "religious" belief and
practice in an environment in which they are fast losing their
distinctiveness, while also eliminating the unfairness of preferring
religiously motivated activities over secular ones that are of equal
moral seriousness.2 8 The prohibition on participation by religious
(but not secular) organizations in the many benefits of the social
welfare state had prevented religion from competing on an even
footing with secular ideologies and organizations; removing that
prohibition also removed this distortion in the marketplace of ideas.2 9
Finally, the application to private religious speech of content- and
viewpoint-based neutrality from Speech Clause forum doctrine
secular reasons); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378,
389-90 (1990) (religious organization not entitled to exemption from general sales tax).
25. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1980) (holding that courts may decide internal
church property and other disputes under the First Amendment when they can do so by
reference to "neutral principles" of secular law).
26. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Ctr. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
27. See Capitol Square Reviev & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840-43 (1995).
28. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the
End of Modernity, 54 DEPAuL L. REv. 1197, 1226-28 (2005); Tushnet, supra note 19, at 380.
29. See FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 56-59
(1995).
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eliminated special penalties on such speech, and similarly eliminated
another obstacle to the fair competition of religious beliefs and
30practices with their secular counterparts.
Despite its many doctrinal advantages, the implementation of
neutrality proved to be doctrinally complicated in cases involving
government sponsorship of religious worship or appropriation of
religious symbols. When religious worship or symbols are
unambiguously appropriated by government, rather than by a private
person or organization, it is impossible in a practical sense for the
government to sponsor the worship or to use the symbol while
remaining neutral among particular religions, and impossible even in
principal for the government to remain neutral between belief and
unbelief. This is because neutrality requires that government sponsor
all versions of the worship or symbol, as well as all analogous secular
practices or symbols. If the government sponsors a prayer, for
example, it cannot select one prayer among the many theological
possibilities; it acts neutrally only if it does not discriminate
theologically on the basis of the content or the prayer or who delivers
it, by affording literally every variety of believer an opportunity to
pray in his or her own religious way, and giving nonbelievers the
chance to deliver secular messages analogous to prayers.3' In
addition to the practical limitations of such a regime, governments are
simply loathe to cede the message-control that is required by Speech
Clause forum analysis.
So, the triumph of neutrality created a challenging doctrinal
problem for government association with religious worship and
symbols. How could their sponsorship or appropriation by
government be squared with the tiber-norm of neutrality? The Court
developed two approaches. The first might be called "historical
secularization," as when the Court characterizes religious practices
or symbols appropriated by government as having lost their
contemporary theological significance and become predominantly
secular; any theological meaning that they retain signifies the
30. See id. at 59-61.
31. Cf Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (Government may
impose restrictions on time, place, or manner of speech in public forums so long as they are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (Government may impose reasonable subject-matter and
speaker-identity restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums and other government property to
preserve such property for its principal use so long as they are viewpoint neutral).
2010]
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understanding of past American societies rather than the current one.
Religious neutrality, in other words, is not violated when government
appropriates symbols whose religiosity is merely historical. The
Court has upheld Sunday closing laws and government-sponsored
Christmas trees in this manner;32 some Justices have also chosen this
tack to justify government use of "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance and government displays of the Ten Commandments.33
This was also the justification chosen by Pleasant Grove City-rather
disingenuously 34-to exclude Summum Bonam's Seven Aphorisms
from a city park that included a decalogue monument. And, as
Justice Scalia insisted in Salazar v. Buono, it may also apply to the
Latin crosses displayed in military cemeteries and on veterans
memorials.36
32. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
33. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (concluding that although the Ten
Commandments have contemporary religious significance, they "have an undeniable historical
meaning" as symbols of the belief of past Americans that God blesses and guides the United
States); id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The plurality opinion] properly recognizes the
role of religion in this Nation's history and the permissibility of government displays
acknowledging that history."); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("The phrase 'under God' in the Pledge seems, as a historical
matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation's leaders .... "); id, at 41 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Whatever the sectarian ends [the Pledge's] authors may have had in mind, our
continued repetition of the reference to 'one Nation under God' in an exclusively patriotic
context has shaped the cultural significance of that phrase to conform to that context. Any
religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has long since been lost.").
34. While Latter-day Saints believe in the Old Testament and thus in the Ten
Commandments, the Commandments are neither an important nor a common symbol of either
contemporary Mormonism or of the Mormon pioneers who founded and settled Pleasant
Grove.
35. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1129-31 (2009) (City restricts
park monuments to those that "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove" or that "were
donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove community").
36. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 2010 WL 1687118,
(No. 08-472) (assertion by Justice Scalia that Latin cross is a traditional symbol honoring all
military dead, including Jewish, Muslim, and other non-Christian veterans, and not just
Christian veterans). Justice Scalia did not repeat this assertion in his Salazar concurrence
because he did not reach the merits, see Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, slip op. at 1-7 (U.S.
Apr. 28, 2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the result on standing grounds), but the point was still
made by Justice Kennedy. See Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, slip op. at 17 (U.S. Apr. 28,
2010) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("[A] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of
Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble
contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in the history for this Nation
and its people. Here, one Latin cross in the desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes
thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who fell in
battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen are forgotten.").
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The second approach might be called "contemporary
neutralization," or, more cynically, the "three-reindeer rule,"
according to which even a religious practice or symbol with potent
contemporary theological content may be sponsored by the
government if it is surrounded by enough secular symbols to balance
or neutralize that content. Using contemporary neutralization, the
Court has upheld government displays of Christian nativities,
37
Jewish menorahs,38 and the ubiquitous Ten Commandments.39
Government sponsorship or appropriation of religious practices
and symbols has deep and widespread popular support, so there has
always been tremendous political and social pressure on the Court to
apply the Establishment Clause in a way that upholds them.
Progressive secularization and contemporary neutralization enable
governments to claim that sponsorship or use of religious symbols
does not violate the requirements of religious neutrality. 40 However,
some of the Court's judgments of secularization or neutralization are
hard to take seriously. It is evident, for example, that some religious
symbols whose religious significance the Court has placed safely in
the past, such as "under God" or the Ten Commandments, retain
potent contemporary theological meaning.41 Similarly, it is unclear
how the deep theological significance of, say, a nativity
commemorating the birth of the Son of God and the Christian Savior
is cancelled or obscured by placing it next to three reindeer, two
See also Bernadette A. Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 Nw. U.L. REV.
95, 107 (1995).
37. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 665, 671, 681-83 (1984) (holding that Christian
nativity surrounded by Santa, reindeer, carolers, clowns, animals, and a Christmas tree had the
secular purpose and primary secular effect of celebrating both the secular and religious
dimensions of Christmas holiday, as well as depicting its religious origins).
38. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(concluding that city display of Christmas tree, Jewish menorah, and sign "saluting liberty" did
not endorse the Christian and Jewish faiths but "merely recognize[d] that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our
society").
39. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701-02 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that the decalogue monument's placement among 17 secular
monuments and 21 secular historical markers conveys "not simply a religious message, but a
secular message as well").
40. Cf Tushnet, supra note 19, at 399 ("[W]here the Justices feel pressure to validate a
religious activity, they are likely to respond by treating it as essentially nonreligious.").
41. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-
Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 275, 292-99 (2007)
(demonstrating the thick, contemporary sectarian significance of the Commandments).
2010]
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clowns, and a partridge in a pear tree.42 Even so, hypocrisy is the
tribute that vice pays to virtue, and if there have been some
questionable uses of these approaches during the normative
predominance of religious neutrality, the Court has nevertheless often
used them to strike down government appropriation of religious
symbols and practices when it did not believe that their religious
significance was merely historical or was balanced by secular
activities or signs in the vicinity.43 Although religious neutrality
seems not to work very well in principle when applied to government
appropriation of religious worship or symbols, the Court has
nevertheless developed a working approximation of neutrality in
practice.
III. JUDEO-CHRISTIAN TOLERANCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF CIVIL RELIGION
The Court's approximation of religious neutrality was not
sufficient for some of the Justices, notably Justice Scalia, who made
this remarkable argument in a dissent from the Court's recent
invalidation of a Decalogue monument:
[T]oday's opinion suggests that the posting of the Ten
Commandments violates the principle that the government cannot
42. See GEDICKS, supra note 30, at 77 (observing that in the Court's decisions in
Allegheny County v. ACLU and Lynch v. Donnelly, "it is the separationist opinions that take
the creche and the menorah seriously as religious symbols, and the accommodationist opinions
that strive to empty them of their spiritual content and replace it with secular meaning").
Compare County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 581 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the menorah as the symbol of a Jewish "celebration that has deep religious
significance") and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Christian nativity as "a mystical recreation of an event that lies at the heart
of the Christian faith," whose symbolic content prompts "a sense of simple awe and wonder
appropriate to the contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian dogma-that God
sent his Son into the world to be a Messiah") with Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 613, 615-617
(opinion of Blackmun, J.) (characterizing Chanukah as an American "cultural tradition"
analogous to Christmas and forming part of the same "winter-holiday season") and Lynch, 465
U.S. at 681, 685 (characterizing the nativity as a commemoration of the "historical origins" of
the Christmas holiday which engenders a "friendly community spirit of goodwill in keeping
with the season") and id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing the meaning of the
nativity as a "celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols").
43. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (courthouse display of
Ten Commandments along with historical and other religious documents); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (student invocations at high school football games);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (nonsectarian junior high school graduation prayer).
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favor one religion over another. That is indeed a valid principle
where public aid or assistance to religion is concerned, or where
the free exercise of religion is at issue, but it necessarily applies in
a more limited sense to public acknowledgment of the Creator. If
religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenominational,
there could be no religion in the public forum at all. One cannot
say the word "God," or "the Almighty," one cannot offer public
supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of
some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay
no attention to human affairs. With respect to public
acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our
Nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits
this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities,
just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.44
Justice Scalia buttresses this constitutional principle of
"monotheistic acknowledgment" by noting that nearly 98% of
American believers are monotheists,45 and draws from this the
conclusion that the trappings of the American civil religion do not
discriminate on the basis of religion, but are merely "publically
honoring God.' ' 6 He makes no mention of the 10 to 15 percent of
Americans who are unbelievers,47 thereby implicity rejecting the
requirement of government neutrality between belief and unbelief that
has long been a component of Establishment Clause doctrine.
From the standpoint of conventional Establishment Clause
wisdom, Justice Scalia has articulated a doctrinal principle whose
apparent lack of limits would render the Establishment Clause largely
inapplicable to government use of religious practices and symbols.
For example, if an overwhelming majority of American monotheists
justifies government appropriation of monotheistic practices and
symbols, why doesn't an overwhelming majority of American
Christians justify government appropriation of Christian practices and
symbols? 48 Indeed, why doesn't the overwhelming predominance of
44. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rhenquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 43, at 285.
48. See Id. at 304 n.139 (quoting Jack Balkin, Justice Scalia Puts His Cards on the
Table, BALKANIzATION, June 27, 2005, available at http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/justice-scalia-puts-his-cards-on-table.htrnl).
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Latter-day Saints in Pleasant Grove City justify a city-sponsored
statue, not of the Ten Commandments but of Moroni, an angel from
whom Mormons believe their founding prophet Joseph Smith
received the Book of Mormon?
49
The idea that a city government could sponsor a Mormon symbol
because the vast majority of its constituents are Latter-day Saints, or
even a more diffuse Judeo-Christian symbols because that majority is
overwhelmingly Jewish and Christian, turns the Establishment Clause
on its head: the Clause exists precisely to prevent combinations of
government and majoritarian religious authority.50  But when one
combines the so-called "government speech doctrine" under the
Speech Clause, a likely shift in the doctrinal focus of the
Establishment Clause from endorsement to coercion, and the
emerging principle Establishment Clause doctrine of permissible
"acknowledgment" of belief by government, Justice Scalia's
doctrinally impossible principle progressively morphs to a possibility,
a plausibility, and even a probability.
A. Government Speech
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 5' the Supreme Court
squarely held that permanent monuments and markers installed in a
city-owned park constituted the city government's own message and
were thus exempt from the neutrality and other constitutional
requirements that protect private speech in government forums.
"Government speech," in other words, is wholly exempt from Speech
Clause restrictions. With this development, Justice Scalia's
seemingly impossible notion has become possible: Government may
properly take account of the religious preferences of an overwhelming
49. See JOSEPH SMITH, THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE, Joseph Smith---JHistory 1 (The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1971) (Smith's personal account of his calling and
mission). Unlike monuments of the Ten Commandments, depictions of Moroni are ubiquitous
in Latter-day Saint culture; a representation appears, for example, on the spire of every
Mormon temple. Of the almost 90% of the population of Pleasant Grove who are affiliated
with a religious congregation, 97% are affiliated with an LDS congregation. See Pleasant
Grove, Utah, Religion Statistics for Pleasant Grove, http://www.city-data.com/city/Pleasant-
Grove-Utah.html (last visited May 30, 2010).
50. See Tushnet, supra note 19, at 386-87; see also Meyler, supra note 38, at 105
(noting the "fundamental contraction between, on the one hand, both the decision in Van
Orden and the Court's developing position on government speech, and, on the other, the
Court's general move in the direction of equality-based reasoning in the religious liberty
area").
51. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009)
[46:691
SEPERATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
demographic majority. Were it to have installed an unambiguously
Mormon icon in its city park, for example, Pleasant Grove City would
have merely acknowledged the demographic obvious, that the city has
been, remains, and is likely always to be overwhelmingly composed
of Latter-day Saints.5
2
B. The Coercion Test
Nevertheless, the Summum majority made it unmistakably clear
that the Establishment Clause applies to government speech, even if
the Speech Clause does not.53 Would not government sponsorship or
recognition of sectarian practices or symbols constitute
unconstitutional endorsement of such practices or symbols in
violation of the Establishment Clause? In Justice O'Connor's classic
formulation, the endorsement test prohibits all government action that
would cause a "reasonable observer" to feel like a favored insider or a
disfavored outsider.54  There is little doubt that government
sponsorship of a sectarian religious practice or symbol constitutes an
endorsement of the particular religion with which the practice or
symbol is associated.
But of course, Justice O'Connor is no longer on the Court. Its
ideological center on Establishment Clause issues, as on so much else,
has shifted to Justice Kennedy-the very same Justice Kennedy who
stridently criticized the endorsement test and called for its
replacement by a coercion test nearly a generation ago.55 As Justice
52. Cf Meyler, supra note 38, at 107-08 ("[A] governmental entity may, counter-
intuitively, face less fear of constitutional challenge if it simply presents a Ten
Commandments monument or another relic of the Judeo-Christian tradition than if it provides
a more ecumenical set of religious icons. . . . [W]hen speaking on its own behalf, the
government could contend that it is allowed to prioritize some religions over others."
(discussing Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he
government could well argue, as a development of the government speech doctrine, that when
it expresses its own views, it is free of the Establishment Clause's stricture against
discriminating among religious sects or groups. Under this view of the relationship between
the two doctrines, it would be easy for a government to favor some private religious speakers
over others by its choice of monuments to accept.")).
53. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131-32. No Establishment Clause issue was raised in
Summum. See id. at 1129.
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.").
55. See ACLU of Pittsburgh v. City & Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("I submit that the
2010]
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [46:691
Kennedy then noted, even a potent theological symbol like the
Christian nativity does not compel anyone "to observe or participate
in any religious ceremony. . . Passersby who disagree with the
message conveyed by the displays are free to ignore them, or even to
turn their backs, just as they are free to do so when they disagree with
any other form of government speech., 56  A statue of Moroni in a
park owned and administered by an overwhelmingly Mormon city is
clearly an endorsement of Mormonism by the city, but it is not
coercive, and thus apparently not a constitutional violation under
Justice Kennedy's favored Establishment Clause test.57 Justice
Kennedy's tepid application of the endorsement test in Salazar v.
Buono suggests that he may indeed be prepared to send it down the
road to irrelevance. 58
C. "Acknowledgment" ofJudeo-Christianity
Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Justice Kennedy
might find it coercive for government to appropriate a sectarian
religious practice or symbol like the hypothetical statue of Moroni in
Pleasant Grove's city park.59 Like Justice Scalia, however, he has no
apparent Establishment Clause objection to government use of the
theologically diffuse practices and symbols of American civil
endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice. The uncritical
adoption of this standard is every bit as troubling as the bizarre result it produces in the cases
before us.").
56. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 662 ("Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive
or symbolic accommodation is minimal."). One caveat: since, for Justice Kennedy, even the
mildest psychological discomfort counts as "coercion," it is possible that, in practice, his
application of a coercion test may overlap substantially with the Court's prior application of
the endorsement test. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (majority opinion by
Kennedy, J.) (holding that social pressure on unbelievers to remain quiet and to stand
respectfully during junior high school graduation prayer constituted government coercion in
violation of the Establishment Clause).
58. See Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, slip op. at 11, 12 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2010) (plurality
opinion) (holding that a large, unadorned cross on World War I memorial signified honor for
the sacrifices of military veterans rather than endorsement of Christianity); see also id., slip op.
at 6 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (arguing that even if the "so-
called 'endorsement test"' were applicable, no government endorsement of religion could arise
from the presence of the cross at the memorial once it had been transferred to private
ownership).
59. See, e.g., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (observing that "[slymbolic recognition or
accommodation of religious faith may violate the Clause in an extreme case," such as the
"permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall").
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religion,60  such as Christian nativities, Chanukah menorahs,
"nonsectarian" legislative prayers, and displays of the Ten
Commandments.6'
If the power of government to endorse religious practices and
symbols under the government speech doctrine is limited to the non-
coercive practices and symbols of a purportedly diffuse Judeo-
Christian or Abrahamic monotheism, as Justices Scalia and Kennedy
have suggested, then the constitutionality of such endorsements under
the Establishment Clause is not merely possible or plausible; it is
probable.
When I first began writing in this area 25 years ago, the most
permissive construction of Establishment Clause limitations was
religious neutrality, and the most restrictive such construction was
strict separation, though the strictures of the latter were balanced by
the then-dominant regime of constitutionally compelled exemptions
that gave special protection to religion under the Free Exercise
Clause. Separationism is now dead, and neutrality under attack; the
most permissive mainstream construction of the Establishment Clause
now permits endorsement of various non-coercive civil religious
practices, while the Court's apparent move to neutrality under the
Free Exercise Clause has been largely reversed by a statutory return
to the special protection of religion afforded by exemptions.62
60. See, e.g., id.
61. Id. at 662-64; see id. at 657 ("Government policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage.... [T]he Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and
accommodating the central role that religion plays in our society.") (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); accord Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, slip op. at
14, 15 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2010) ("The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not
require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm .... The Constitution does not
oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgement of religion's role in society.").
Additionally, Justice Kennedy joined in the plurality opinion upholding the constitutionality of
the decalogue monument in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 679 (2005), and joined Justice
Scalia's dissent (although not its most pointed part) from the Court's invalidation of the
monument in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2006) (providing that federal government action that substantially burdens the free exercise of
religion must satisfy strict scrutiny even when the action is generally applicable and religiously
neutral); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2006) (same with respect to state action that burdens the religious free exercise of
those held in state custody, and state land use regulations that burden the construction and
operation of places of worship and other religious property uses); I WILLIAM W. BASSETT, ET.
AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §§ 2:57, 2:58 (updated 2009) (listing 25 states
that mandate strict or heightened judicial scrutiny to generally applicable and religiously
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In short, any semblance of balance between anti-establishment
and free exercise doctrine is long gone. Religion is once again
preferred to secular moral commitments under the Free Exercise
Clause, and under the Establishment Clause the best that
separationists can now hope for is religious neutrality. Given how
dramatically the limitations of the Establishment Clause were relaxed
during the last twenty-five years, one must wonder how much will be
left of them in another twenty-five.
neutral state action that imposes incidental burdens on religious exercise).
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